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Abstract
Computer simulations are increasingly being used to predict the behaviour of crowds.
However, the models used are mainly based on video observations, not an understanding of
human decision making. Theories of crowd psychology can elucidate the factors
underpinning collective behaviour in human crowds. Yet, in contrast to psychology,
computer science must rely upon mathematical formulations in order to implement
algorithms and keep models manageable. Here we address the problems and possible
solutions encountered when incorporating social psychological theories of collective
behaviour in computer modelling. We identify that one primary issue is retaining
parsimony in a model whilst avoiding reductionism by excluding necessary aspects of crowd
psychology, such as the behaviour of groups. We propose cognitive heuristics as a potential
avenue to create a parsimonious model that incorporates core concepts of collective
behaviour derived from empirical research in crowd psychology.
Keywords: crowd psychology, pedestrian dynamics, interdisciplinary, social identity
approach, collective behaviour
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Parsimony versus reductionism: How can crowd psychology be introduced into computer
simulation?
Introduction
Computer simulations of pedestrian crowds are being increasingly used for event,
transportation and evacuation planning (e.g., Daamen, Duives, & Hoogendoorn, 2014).
They can help to ensure comfort and safety, such as for festivals, large sporting events,
railway stations, and other indoor environments. The general motivation to develop these
simulations is to predict crowd movement. In addition to the practical applications,
simulation models may also be used to formalise and test hypotheses from social
psychology (Strube, 2000). However, the development of simulation tools that accurately
predict human behaviour is still at an early stage. This is partially due to practical
limitations; for example, it is difficult to gain in vivo empirical data from emergency
situations. Empirical data is necessary for the design and calibration of models given the
research question of the study. Additional empirical data is needed for the validation of the
calibrated model (e.g., Bandini, Gorrini, & Vizzari, 2014). Even when video footage is
available, it maybe be necessary to integrate modern social psychological theories to gain a
deeper understanding of crowd behaviour.
There are two major categories of computer simulations for crowd dynamics:
microscopic and macroscopic models. With macroscopic models, the overall flow or
dynamic of the crowd is simulated, but not the individual pedestrian’s behaviour. One
particularly important implication from crowd psychology is that there are two types of
crowds. On one hand there are physical crowds, which are comprised of numerous
individuals or small groups within the crowd. On the other hand, there are psychological
crowds where the members of a crowd share a group identity, which affects their behaviour
(Reicher & Drury, 2010). Hence, in order to accurately simulate different types of crowds,
we need to attend to what type of crowd is being modelled and what assumptions the
modellers are making about them. To model behaviour in line with crowd psychology –
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where individuals have the ability to become members of groups – microscopic models
would be needed.
While the importance of crowd psychology for engineering has been noted (Aguirre,
El-Tawil, Best, Gill, & Fedorov, 2011; Sime, 1995), theories of crowd psychology have only
been minimally incorporated into mathematical modelling and computer simulations, and
from a psychological point of view, these are out-dated (Templeton, Drury, & Philippides,
2015). A more promising direction of research are proxemics (Baum & Paulus, 1987; Hall,
1966), which describe the social distances individuals keep from one another and has been
used for the study of crowd behaviour (Costa, 2010; von Sivers & Köster, 2015; Zanlungo,
Ikeda, & Kanda, 2014). Although there have been some attempts to introduce small
groups within the larger crowd behaviour to simulation models such as families, friends or
other predefined groups (Köster, Seitz, Treml, Hartmann, & Klein, 2011; Moussaïd, Perozo,
Garnier, Helbing, & Theraulaz, 2010; Singh et al., 2009; Yang, Zhao, Li, & Fang, 2005),
these models do not consider the social structure or dynamic of the whole crowd (for a
comprehensive review, see (Templeton et al., 2015)). For example, concepts such as
“contagion” between individuals are still referred to in recent literature (e.g., Fridman &
Kaminka, 2007; Helbing, Farkas, Molnár, & Vicsek, 2002). However, “contagion” was
popularized by Le Bon (Le Bon, 1895) in an attempt to explain social influence and
homogeneity in crowds and has been challenged by research showing that behaviour in
crowds does not spread automatically, but rather is limited by the extent to which
participants share a social identity (Reicher, 1984, 1996). Another example is the notion of
an irrational “panic” behaviour in disasters at mass events, despite most scientists in the
field arguing that “mass panic” is actually a myth (Aguirre, 2005; Drury, Novelli, & Stott,
2013; Johnson, 1987).
Modern social psychology has developed an alternative theory of crowd behaviour
based on an extensive programme of empirical evidence: the social identity approach. This
approach has been used to understand numerous instances of collective behaviour,
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including behaviour at riots, protests, religious ceremonies, and music festivals (Abrams &
Hogg, 1990; Alnabulsi & Drury, 2014; Drury, Cocking, Reicher, Burton, et al., 2009;
Neville & Reicher, 2011; Novelli, Drury, & Reicher, 2010; Reicher, 1984, 1996).
These debates in social psychology are important for the computer simulation of
crowds because understanding them may avert relying upon out-dated theories or the use
of concepts that are not suitable explanations for particular types of crowds. For example,
outdated theories such as “contagion” cannot explain the boundaries of behaviour in
crowds that behave together as a cohesive group, such as the coordinated actions one sees
in a Mexican wave by supporters of a sports team, or survivors of emergency situations
who work together for the sake of the whole crowd.
A correct understanding of current concepts and theories from social psychology is
prerequisite to carrying them over to computer simulations. Furthermore, when attempting
to simulate phenomena predicted by theories from social psychology, it is also crucial to
understand the challenges and limitations that exist in mathematical modelling. In
microscopic simulations, the motion of individual virtual humans (hereafter referred to as
agents) is simulated. In most microscopic models, the behaviour of agents is highly
abstracted from reality and focuses on observable motion in specific scenarios, such as
egress from a room through a bottleneck or bi-directional flow (Burstedde, Klauck,
Schadschneider, & Zittartz, 2001; Helbing & Molnár, 1995; Seitz & Köster, 2012). The
underlying mechanisms producing this behaviour are simple and are usually not primarily
aimed at representing the human cognitive process (Moussaïd & Nelson, 2014). This poses
a key problem when creating a model with the purpose of realistically simulating the
numerous factors of social cognition. We put forward that one avenue to negotiate the
complexities of social psychological models with the necessary parsimonious approach of
mathematical modelling is through cognitive heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer,
Todd, & A.B.C. Research Group, 1999; Seitz, Bode, & Köster, 2016). Cognitive heuristics
allow for agents to make flexible decisions based on a set of criteria, which provides ample
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ground to incorporate cognition we know from social psychology into a rule-based model of
social behaviour.
In this article, we aim to examine the difficulties that could arise from merging
mathematical modelling and social psychology. In section 2, we provide a short overview
on crowd research in social psychology. In section 3, we briefly review main tendencies in
pedestrian and crowd computer simulation models. We then discuss the difficulties of
introducing concepts from social psychology into simulation models from a theoretical
standpoint in section 4. In section 5, we propose cognitive heuristics (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999) as a modelling paradigm, which may help to bring crowd psychology and computer
simulations closer together. Finally, in section 6, we discuss the arguments presented in
this paper and provide an outlook on possible future work in this area.
The study of crowds in social psychology
A brief history of crowd psychology: individuals versus the group
Research on crowd psychology has produced various theories to account for the
emergence of collective behaviour in crowds. However, three key approaches have been
particularly influential. These are: a) the “group mind” approaches, b) approaches
focussing on individuals, and c) contemporary accounts of collective behaviour, which seek
to address the relationship between individuals and collective behaviour using the concepts
of norm and identity. This section will outline these three approaches.
Within the “group mind” accounts, crowds were understood as homogeneous entities
where the individuals in the crowd became indistinguishable from the “mass”. Le Bon
(1895) suggested that people descend into mindless irrationality upon entering a crowd,
where every crowd member shares the same thoughts and is susceptible to manipulation by
a leader. Other accounts, such as that of Allport (1924), took the opposite end of the
spectrum and argued that there is no sense of “group mind”. Instead, the activity of the
crowd is merely the behaviour of an aggregate of individuals. Here, rather than people
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succumbing to a group mind, collective behaviour occurs through social facilitation. Social
facilitation means that the presence of others enhances the likelihood of pre-existing
behaviours in the individual to emerge. As Allport (1924) says, “the individual in the
crowd behaves just as he would behave alone only more so” (p. 295).
Subsequent researchers in crowd psychology argued that neither the theory of a group
mind nor theories only considering individuals can adequately explain the social form of
collective behaviour – i.e., the fact that crowd behaviour is both coordinated and socially
meaningful (Asch, 1952; Reicher, 2001). Following this argument, interactionist
approaches, such as that of Sherif (1967), proposed that being in a group has psychological
consequences not reducible to those of the individual. The focus of collective behaviour
research then turned to investigate how group norms were established, such as the group’s
aims, rules and beliefs, and which behaviours were seen to be legitimate or illegitimate by
members of the group (R. H. Turner & Killian, 1957).
In the last 30 years, small group approaches in social psychology and approaches
emphasizing the individual need to be with familiar others have focused on the
relationships between subgroups within a crowd. For example, studies of emergency
evacuations indicated that, when in danger, people will attempt to remain with a small
group with whom they have pre-existent social ties (Johnson, 1988; Mawson, 2005; Sime,
1983). However, reducing crowd behaviour to the interaction of small groups cannot always
explain large-scale collective behaviour since the members of the crowd may cooperate
across the borders of pre-existing subgroups. For example, a study of fans at an outdoor
music event found that while people arrived mostly in small friendship groups, cooperative
behaviours (including assisting others in need, protecting others’ privacy, and coordinating
evacuation) were common among strangers (Drury, Novelli, & Stott, 2015).
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Towards an understanding of large-scale collective behaviour
One leading approach to explain collective behaviour where the entire crowd acts as a
group is self-categorisation theory (J. C. Turner, 1982, 1987). Self-categorisation theory
provides the tools to explain why individuals consider themselves members of a group, even
when those individuals have not previously interacted. This theory proposes that collective
behaviour is based on the process of depersonalisation (J. C. Turner, 1985, 1987). That is,
individuals self-stereotype and perceive themselves as being interchangeable with others in
that social group. By doing this, individuals shift from their personal identity to their
social identity as a member of a particular social group and are therefore able to coordinate
their actions with other group members who share the same social identity.
Over the past decade, there has been increased recognition that the concept of a
shared social identity is necessary for more realistic simulation of human collective
behaviour (Aguirre et al., 2011; Köster et al., 2011; Langston, Masling, & Asmar, 2006;
Smith et al., 2009; Templeton et al., 2015). The ability of self-categorisation theory to
explain collective behaviour in numerous contexts indicates that computer simulations
could benefit from applying this theory to adequately reproduce a broad variety of
collective behaviour scenarios. However, it is not obvious how to carry concepts such as
self-categorisation over to mathematical modelling and computer simulation. A model
based on self-categorisation theory would require agents to be able to have social identities
and to coordinate actions with other members of their group. In the next section, we will
briefly discuss the main approaches in microscopic computer simulation of human crowds
to lay the foundations for understanding this issue.
Computer simulations of crowd behaviour
A variety of crowd models for computer simulation have been proposed. The most
basic classification is microscopic versus macroscopic models (e.g., Duives, Daamen, &
Hoogendoorn, 2013). In this section, we are only concerned with the microscopic modelling
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approach in which individual behaviour, but not gross features such as pedestrian flow, is
modelled. Although macroscopic models may be useful for some applications, they do not
provide the possibility of modelling cognitive processes. Therefore, we argue that
macroscopic models are not appropriate for reproducing the phenomena of collective
behaviour in crowds.
The first microscopic computer simulation model of crowds known to the authors is
that by Gipps and Marksjö (1985), which uses a cellular grid for individual locomotion
steps. In this simulation model, each agent occupies one cell in the grid, and occupied cells
cannot be entered by other agents. The choice of where to make the next step is made by
evaluating the attractiveness of adjacent cells around the current position of an agent. This
attractiveness could also be interpreted as utility and the choice of cell as utility
optimisation (Seitz, Dietrich, & Köster, 2015). The second approach, by Helbing and
Molnár (1995), is based on the idea of “social forces”, which are then interpreted as actual
physical forces accelerating the agents as in particle physics. Although the authors refer to
the original concept of social forces by Lewin (1951), the mathematical formulation and
computation is simply that of physical forces. Alternative approaches are probabilistic
cellular models (Burstedde et al., 2001), the optimisation of direction and speed according
to perceptual cues in the environment (Moussaïd, Helbing, & Theraulaz, 2011; Moussaïd &
Nelson, 2014), and stepwise motion and utility optimisation in continuous space (Seitz &
Köster, 2012). In the following, we take a step back and investigate simulation models for
crowds from a more theoretical standpoint. This standpoint is intended to prepare for the
discussion on parsimony and reductionism.
All of the models mentioned, except the one by Moussaïd et al. (2011), are implicitly
based on the idea of approach-avoidance motivation (Elliot, 2006). The spatial
attractiveness is then interpreted as either potential (causing forces), utility, or probability
(Seitz, Dietrich, Köster, & Bungartz, 2016). All of the models are simplifications – or
idealisations – of the real world. The models are the results of simultaneous Aristotelian
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idealisations, because they deliberately omit properties, and Galilean idealisations, as they
deliberately distort properties (Frigg & Hartmann, 2012). For example, simulated agents
do not have hair colour because this is a superfluous aspect in the simulation, thus
following an Aristotelian idealisation. Additionally, an agent’s body is represented by a
simple geometrical shape, such as circles in a two-dimensional world, which is a Galilean
idealisation. Since both types of simplifications are heavily used in crowd modelling, it
could be argued that they are caricatures: they only emphasise some aspects of reality.
However, the objective is rather that of an approximation, a description of reality in an
approximate way (Gibbard & Varian, 1978).
We argue that most microscopic crowd simulation models might be best characterised
as phenomenological models (Mcmullin, 1968): they describe observable properties of
crowd behaviour, but not their inner workings. For instance, individuals might act in a way
that makes it look as though their motion was determined by physical potentials and
forces, or utility optimisation, but these concepts do not reflect human cognition
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Furthermore, observations of crowd movement, as opposed to
findings from empirical psychological research, are commonly used for the development or
validation of computer models. While observations and controlled experiments of crowd
movement are indispensable for the validation of models and the calibration of model
parameters (Schadschneider & Seyfried, 2011), the neglect of realistic decision-making
processes might inhibit the advancement of simulation models, especially the introduction
of group psychology. Simulation models of crowds that not only reproduce the observable
outcome but also the cognitive process behind it (Moussaïd & Nelson, 2014) may facilitate
the introduction of concepts from social psychology.
From a theoretical standpoint, microscopic crowd models seem to have been
developed with one objective: describing some proposed phenomena with a simple
mathematical description. In the course of this development process, findings from
psychology have been largely neglected. The goal of describing phenomena in a concise way
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based on local interactions seems to have prevailed so far in computer simulation of crowds,
which raises the issue of whether this is justified. If that should be the case, does this
description of phenomena represent an intrinsic contradiction to the avoidance of
reductionism as discussed in the previous section?
On parsimony and reductionism
There are several arguments for the parsimony of models and theories (Baker, 2013).
One argument stands out due to its importance and generality in science: the criterion of
falsifiability (Popper, 2002). Falsifiability means that statements (that is, theories) are
susceptible to empirical testing such that they can, in principle, be shown by evidence to
be false. If there are no deducible hypotheses that can be tested, the theory cannot be
considered a scientific theory. If we accept this criterion, it follows that we should not
introduce arbitrary or ad hoc extensions to a theory as this would prevent falsification (for
an extended analysis, see (Forster & Sober, 1994)).
In the practice of modelling crowds, behaviour for a specific situation or observation
could be added to the model in order to match some empirical observation and thereby
evade falsification. Furthermore, how many parameters are acceptable in a model before it
can no longer be falsified due to its flexibility. Another issue is the overfitting to one
particular behaviour rather than creating a model that is applicable to numerous scenarios
(Moussaïd & Nelson, 2014).
A crucial point in addressing reductionism is that the simplicity of models may have
many facets. A model can be simple in terms of analogies, mathematics, or ease of
implementation in software. It may not be immediately obvious which of two models is
more concise, due to the multiple criteria for concision. For instance, physicists may find
force-based models appealing, whereas computer scientists may prefer optimisation
approaches. One criterion with vast practical implications is the computational effort
needed to simulate crowd behaviour. This can significantly inhibit scientific investigation of
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a simulation model: if the computation is not efficient, fewer scenarios can be studied and
compared to empirical results. In some practical applications, there are rigid requirements
for computational performance. An example is the projection of an ongoing crowd
movement scenario into the future as a means of ensuring safety at a mass event.
Other criteria may be reasonable for specific applications, objectives, and research
domains. Any of the criteria, whether justified or not or deliberate or not, may influence
the choice of modelling approach. However, modellers and practitioners should be aware of
the criteria they are using to make an educated decision. Ideally one would select criteria
first, possibly weight them, and subsequently choose an approach or model based on these
provisions.
In the interest of having a parsimonious model of collective behaviour, it might seem
obvious that simple individual “rules of thumb” are preferable to a representation of the
group in each agent, as suggested by self-categorisation theory. Nevertheless, this may not
always be the case: some phenomena may be more concisely described with the latter
category of models with a representation of the group in each agent. For example, the
behaviour of two conflicting groups, such as the fans of opposing sport teams, can be
understood using the social identity approach but is difficult to explain using individualistic
theories. It is more plausible, and simpler, to suggest that their common chants, emotions
and reactions to each other are a function of their common identities and common
relationship to each other, rather than suggesting there is a coincidence of reaction among
multiple individual personalities. This explains why a model for individual commuters
walking on a pavement in contraflow cannot be used to model how fans of opposing teams
interact when walking next to each other: the dynamics in a physical crowd of commuters
is fundamentally different from the dynamics of a psychological crowd of fans.
Another demand for parsimony arises from mathematical modelling itself. That is,
the requirements for a simulation model are strict: one can only implement an algorithm
that simulates behaviour if all phenomena and processes have been formally determined;
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vagueness and loose ends are not acceptable.
Certainly the need for parsimony in social psychological models is as important as the
need for parsimony in mathematical modelling. However, models and theories in social
psychology are often complex and nuanced due to the complexity of real world social
phenomena. Even in highly controlled laboratory experiment it is difficult to control all the
factors which could influence the outcome. Social psychological models and theories tend
to – by necessity due to the openness of social worlds – have unknown parameters, which
makes them difficult to implement into an algorithmic description. In mathematical
modelling, on the other hand, mathematical systems are concise and closed. The open
character and large number of parameters presents a challenge to implementing social
psychology into mathematical modelling and eventually to developing an algorithmic
description.
In contrast to the idea of parsimony described above, we consider reductionism as an
inappropriate or insufficient account of real facts. In crowd psychology, reductionism occurs
when either psychological groups or individuals are not included in accounts of collective
behaviour. This is also seen in simulation models: most microscopic models only consider
local interactions among individuals without a representation of group structures (Duives
et al., 2013; Templeton et al., 2015; Zheng, Zhong, & Liu, 2009). In microscopic
simulations, the crowd’s behaviour is expected to emerge from simple interactions between
individuals. This could be one reason why microscopic simulation models tend to be based
on local interactions without the consideration of more complex social structures within
the crowd. Although subgroup behaviour may be one (important) step in the direction of a
more socially structured crowd, scenarios where the crowd acts together as a group, such as
in emergency situations, are still neglected (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009a; Drury,
Cocking, Reicher, Burton, et al., 2009).
If we consider it evident that there are group processes which cannot be described by
simple local interactions among agents, then neglecting these group processes would be
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reductionist. Ignoring group processes may not be a problem in scenarios where social
identities do not influence the crowd’s behaviour, such as in a physical crowd of
commuters, who may not share a social identity in general (Drury, Cocking, & Reicher,
2009b). However, if we want to explain more complex collective behaviour, then we may
have to consider developing simulation models with an explicit representation of
psychological groups in each agent.
There are some key aspects of self-categorisation theory that could be used for
simulation models. As mentioned previously, agents must be capable of recognising their
own group identity and the group identity of other agents, and capable of acting as an
individual or as a group member depending on their salient identity at the time. Given
these prerequisites, behaviours resulting from a social identity process could be introduced
into decision-making of agents, which would allow for a more profound form of cooperation
and collective behaviour.
A primarily phenomenological approach to crowd simulation poses a problem: the
models themselves were not necessarily designed to be extendible, flexible, or to include
higher levels of complexity in collective behaviour. While this problem might have
prohibited the introduction of models from social psychology, it is possible to introduce
additional behaviour to existing models. For instance, subgroups have been introduced
successfully to force-based models (Moussaïd et al., 2010).
The situation is challenging due to the complexity of social interactions and human
behaviour and the requirement of precise mathematical formulation of models for computer
simulations. Furthermore, the objectives are somewhat opposing: on the one hand, we
hope to avoid reductionism by providing an explanation for complex behaviour, and on the
other hand, we try to ensure parsimony by keeping theories and models concise. This is not
a contradiction specific to the development of crowd simulation models but rather a general
challenge in all of science.
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Parsimony without reductionism
Two approaches for simulation of social aspects in crowds
In this section, we discuss two approaches that may allow for the simulation of a
social identity process with agents. First, one can try to extend existing models with a
social layer in addition to the basic interaction and locomotion mechanisms (Köster et al.,
2011; Moussaïd et al., 2010; Singh et al., 2009; von Sivers, Templeton, Köster, Drury, &
Philippides, 2014; Yang et al., 2005). Second, one could develop a new decision-making
framework that provides the necessary structure and flexibility we need. The first approach
seems appealing as existing models have been calibrated and tested with empirical data for
certain phenomena. One could strive to build on these achievements. We would need to
use and alter the existing mechanisms in such models, which could render previous testing
and calibration invalid. Finally, the available mechanism might not provide the necessary
modelling flexibility. In the following paragraphs, we present arguments for the second
approach although we consider both approaches valuable.
In the literature, agent-based modelling (e.g., Bonabeau, 2002; Goldstone & Janssen,
2005) has been proposed as an approach that might provide the necessary modelling
flexibility. The term “agent-based modelling” has been used with different meanings. We
define it as an approach with simulated pedestrians (agents) that have individual
attributes, goals and cognition. Some authors use an existing interaction and locomotion
model, such as the social force model, and extend it to meet their requirements (Zheng et
al., 2009). In other words, those models fall into the first category described in the
previous paragraph.
The main critique here is that although agent-based models are often very flexible,
most do not make use of contemporary concepts from psychology and do not compare their
results with empirical data. Thus, while agent-based models can be interesting from an
engineering standpoint, they may not be suitable for credible scientific theories. This does
not mean agent-based models are inappropriate for this purpose in general, but it has to be
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shown that it is possible to deduce testable hypotheses from them.
Instead of extending existing local interaction and locomotion models, or using
agent-based models, an alternative is to approximate human decision-making processes
(Moussaïd et al., 2011; Moussaïd & Nelson, 2014; Zanlungo, Ikeda, & Kanda, 2012). In the
following section, we propose this approach as a modelling paradigm that may have
advantages.
Towards cognitive modelling
How could the attempt to model agents’ behaviour according to more plausible
cognitive decision-making processes help in the predicament of avoiding reductionism and
maintaining parsimony at the same time? First, cognitive modelling would lead away from
a merely behavioural (that is, phenomenological) explanation to theories attempting to
explain the underlying processes (Moussaïd & Nelson, 2014). This itself could be seen as
advantageous. Second, cognitive modelling might provide the necessary flexibility and
expandability in crowd models to allow the introduction of aspects of psychology not
previously incorporated. For example, in this paper we argue for the incorporation of the
social identity approach, which may motivate using cognitive modelling. Third, one could
expect that more plausible decision-making processes also lead to more plausible behaviour
of simulated agents.
As a fundamental paradigm for cognitive modelling, we suggest to use bounded
rationality (Newell & Simon, 1972) and cognitive heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer
et al., 1999; Muntanyola-Saura, 2014). The proponents of this paradigm argue that human
decision making has to be based on evolutionary developed cognitive capacities, such as the
ability to estimate distances or predict movement based on previous movement cues.
Furthermore, they suggest that humans do not make decisions based on mathematical
optimisation, but rather employ simple heuristics, which may or may not lead to the
optimal solution and do not require unbounded computational power.
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Gigerenzer calls the collection of heuristics used by an individual an adaptive toolbox
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999). This suggests that various heuristics can be used for decision
making tasks, which introduces high modelling flexibility. Does this mean the adaptive
toolbox is a theory that easily introduces ad hoc hypotheses without ever becoming
falsifiable? Indeed, the hypothesis that humans make decisions based on cognitive
heuristics cannot be easily falsified: it is a higher order assumption or perspective that
must be tested on another level. The concrete heuristics, however, are hypotheses
themselves, and their predictions can be tested.
Cognitive heuristics represent plausible decision-making processes and have already
been used to describe local avoidance behaviour of pedestrians (Seitz, Bode, & Köster,
2016). They also seem appropriate for specific behavioural aspects, for example, the route
choice in complex spatial layouts (e.g., Hoogendoorn & Bovy, 2004; Kneidl, Borrmann, &
Hartmann, 2012). Therefore, we can also consider this approach to be suitable for the
introduction of models from crowd psychology, such as self-categorization theory, which is
already a social and cognitive model (J. C. Turner, 1987). While some core aspects of the
social identity approach may not be cognitive, such as the importance of social context (or
social reality), these aspects could still function together with a cognitive model. For
instance, the extent to which a person categorises one’s self within the group at a specific
moment is influenced by the social environment (J. C. Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty,
1994). A cognitive model for agents and a formal model for the social identity approach
may be parsimonious and simultaneously avoid reductionism if they can explain some
collective behaviour that has not yet been captured in computer modelling, such as fans of
opposing sport teams.
Discussion
Throughout this article we have discussed crowd psychology, crowd computer
simulation and the challenges that arise from their interdisciplinary nature. Our focus has
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been to examine the seemingly contradictory tendencies between parsimony in simulation
modelling while avoiding reductionism in social psychology. We have brought forward the
argument that both are legitimate objectives in science, but could be somewhat in
opposition to each other. However, this opposition does not seem to be a problem specific
to the development of crowd simulations. We have argued that these two principles
constitute general opponents in science: should we make models more complex to explain
more features of reality and avoid reductionism, which, in turn, may make them less
parsimonious?
Due to the extensive empirical research on crowd behaviour, social psychology is
clearly important for crowd simulation modelling. In the end, what we want to reproduce
or predict is human behaviour in varying social environments and settings. Most research
in crowd simulation has focused on purely observable features, such as flow and densities,
which are very important and can be used for practical applications (Schadschneider et al.,
2009). However, this focus might inhibit the development of simulation models in the
future and prohibit the carry-over of established concepts from psychology.
Simulation models could be beneficial for studying crowd models in social psychology
and vice versa. The use of crowd simulation models can help to formalize and investigate
theories from social psychology in a closed environment, which might lead to a better
understanding of crowd models. We understand the interdisciplinary discussions as
presented in this paper not only challenging but also as a fruitful and constructive way to
develop theories in both simulation modelling and social psychology.
We expect cognitive models for pedestrian behaviour to be constructive in future
research. In general, this would require a stronger engagement by mathematical modellers
in cognitive sciences and psychology from mathematical modellers. Moussaïd et al. (2011)
have described a model that points in that direction attempting to explain pedestrian
behaviour with simple rules. Following this approach, we put forward the concept of
cognitive heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2008; Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Muntanyola-Saura, 2014),
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which is not a model itself, but a paradigm describing how to model human
decision-making.
Social psychology and computer modelling are both being used separately to plan
and monitor safety at mass crowd events. By combining their knowledge, together these
disciplines could have a real and important impact on the safety of large crowd events.
Many challenges remain in computer simulation of human crowds. Empirical validation of
candidate models may be infeasible if the scenarios, such as disasters, are not observed
often. We argue, however, that the integration of findings from social sciences is a
promising avenue for future simulation model development.
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